Inferring Mental States from Neuroimaging Data: From Reverse Inference to Large-Scale Decoding  by Poldrack, Russell A.
Neuron
PerspectiveInferring Mental States from Neuroimaging Data:
From Reverse Inference to Large-Scale DecodingRussell A. Poldrack1,*
1Imaging Research Center and Departments of Psychology and Neurobiology, University of Texas at Austin, 3925-B W. Braker Lane,
Austin, TX 78759, USA
*Correspondence: poldrack@mail.utexas.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.11.001
A common goal of neuroimaging research is to use imaging data to identify the mental processes that are
engaged when a subject performs a mental task. The use of reasoning from activation to mental functions,
known as ‘‘reverse inference,’’ has been previously criticized on the basis that it does not take into account
how selectively the area is activated by the mental process in question. In this Perspective, I outline the
critique of informal reverse inference and describe a number of new developments that provide the ability
to more formally test the predictive power of neuroimaging data.Understanding the relationship between psychological pro-
cesses and brain function, the ultimate goal of cognitive neuro-
science, is made particularly difficult by the fact that psycholog-
ical processes are poorly defined and not directly observable,
and human brain function can only be measured through
the highly blurred and distorted lens of neuroimaging tech-
niques. However, the development of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) 20 years ago afforded a new and
muchmore powerful way to address this question in comparison
to previous methods, and the fruits of this technology are
apparent in the astounding number of publications using fMRI
in recent years.
The classic strategy employed by neuroimaging researchers
(established most notably by Petersen, Posner, Fox, and Raichle
in their early work using positron emission tomography; Petersen
et al., 1988; Posner et al., 1988) has been tomanipulate a specific
psychological function and identify the localized effects of that
manipulation on brain activity. This has been referred to as
‘‘forward inference’’ (Henson, 2005) and is the basis for a large
body of knowledge that has been derived from neuroimaging
research. However, since the early days of neuroimaging, there
has also been a desire to reason backward from patterns of acti-
vation to infer the engagement of specificmental processes. This
has been called ‘‘reverse inference’’ (Poldrack, 2006; Aguirre,
2003) and often forms much of the reasoning observed in the
discussion section of neuroimaging papers (under the guise of
‘‘interpreting the results’’). In some cases, reverse inference
underlies the central conclusion of a paper. For example, Taka-
hashi et al. (2009) examined the neural correlates of the experi-
ence of envy and schadenfreude. They found that envy was
associated with activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, in
which they note, ‘‘Cognitive conflicts or social pain are pro-
cessed’’ (p. 938), whereas schadenfreude was associated with
activation in the ventral striatum, ‘‘a central node of reward pro-
cessing’’ (p. 938). The abstract concludes as follows: ‘‘Our find-
ings document mechanisms of painful emotion, envy, and
a rewarding reaction, schadenfreude,’’ in which the psycholog-
ical states (i.e., pain or reward) are inferred primarily from activa-
tion in specific regions (anterior cingulate or ventral striatum).692 Neuron 72, December 8, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.This is just one of many examples of reverse inference that are
evident in the neuroimaging literature, and even the present
author is not immune.
Reverse inference is also common in public presentations of
imaging research. A prime example occurred during the
US Presidential Primary elections in 2007, when the
New York Times published an op-ed by a group of researchers
titled ‘‘This is Your Brain on Politics’’ (Iacoboni et al., 2007). This
piece reported an unpublished study of potential swing voters
who were shown a set of videos of the candidates while being
scanned using fMRI. Based on these imaging data, the authors
made a number of claims about the voters’ feelings regarding
the candidates. For example, ‘‘When our subjects viewed
photos of Mr. Thompson, we saw activity in the superior
temporal sulcus and the inferior frontal cortex, both areas
involved in empathy,’’ and, ‘‘Looking at photos of Mitt Romney
led to activity in the amygdala, a brain area linked to anxiety.’’
More recently, another New York Times op-ed by a marketing
writer used unpublished fMRI data to infer that people are ‘‘in
love’’ with their iPhones (Lindstrom, 2011). Clearly, the desire
to ‘‘read minds’’ using neuroimaging is strong.
In 2006, I published a paper that challenged the common use
of reverse inference in the neuroimaging literature (Poldrack,
2006; for a similar earlier critique, see Aguirre, 2003). Since
the publication of those critiques, ‘‘reverse inference’’ has
gradually become a bad word in some quarters, though very
often a citation to those papers is used as a fig leaf to excuse
the use of reverse inference. At the same time, a number of
researchers have argued that it is a fundamentally important
research tool, especially in areas such as neuroeconomics
and social neuroscience, in which the underlying mental
processes may be less well understood (e.g., Young and
Saxe, 2009). In what follows, I will lay out and update the argu-
ment against reverse inference as it is often practiced in the
literature. I will then describe how recent developments in
statistical analysis and informatics have provided new and
more powerful ways to infer mental states from neuroimaging
data and discuss the limitations of those techniques. I will
conclude by highlighting what I see as important challenges
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understand mental function.
A Probabilistic Framework for Inference
in Neuroimaging
The goal of reverse inference is to infer the likelihood of a partic-
ular mental process M from a pattern of brain activity A, which
can be framed as a conditional probability P(MjA) (see Sarter
et al., 1996 for a similar formulation). Neuroimaging data provide
information regarding the likelihood of that pattern of activation
given the engagement of the mental process, P(AjM); this could
be activation in a specific region or a specific pattern of activity
across multiple regions. The amount of evidence that is obtained
for a prediction of mental process engagement from activation
can be estimated using Bayes’ rule:
PðMjAÞ= PðAjMÞ3PðMÞ
PðAjMÞ3PðMÞ+PðAjMÞ3PðMÞ
Notably, estimation of this quantity requires knowledge of the
base rate of activation A, as well as a prior estimate of the prob-
ability of engagement of mental process M. Given these, we can
obtain an estimate of how likely the mental process is given the
pattern of activation. The amount of additional evidence that the
pattern of activity provides for engagement of the mental
process can be framed in terms of the ratio between the poste-
rior odds and prior odds, known as the Bayes factor. To the
degree that the base rate of activation in the region is high
(i.e., it is activated for many different mental processes), then
activation in that region will provide little added evidence for
engagement of a specific mental process; conversely, if that
region is very specifically activated by a particular mental
process, then activation provides a great deal of evidence for
engagement of the mental process.
This framework highlights the importance of base rates of
activation for quantifying the strength of any reverse inference,
but such base rates were not easy to obtain until recently. In
Poldrack (2006), I used the BrainMap database to obtain esti-
mates of activation likelihoods and base rates for one particular
reverse inference (viz., that activation of Broca’s area implied
engagement of language function). This analysis showed that
activation in this region provided limited additional evidence for
engagement of language function. For example, if one started
with a prior of P(M) = 0.5, activation in Broca’s area increased
the likelihood to 0.69, which equates to a Bayes factor of 2.3;
Bayes factors below 4 are considered weak. Others have since
published similar analyses that were somewhat more promising;
for example, Ariely and Berns (2010) found that activation in the
ventral striatum increased the likelihood of reward by a Bayes
factor of 9, which is considered moderately strong.
One drawback of the BrainMap database is that the papers in
the database are manually chosen to be entered and thus reflect
a biased sample of the literature. In recent work, we (Yarkoni
et al., 2011) developed an automated means to obtain activation
coordinate data (like those contained in BrainMap) from the full
text of published articles; currently, the database contains data
from 3,489 articles from 17 different journals. These data (which
are available online at http://www.neurosynth.org) provide
a less-biased means to quantify base rates of activation (thoughbiases clearly remain due to the lack of complete and equal
coverage of all possible mental states in the literature). Figure 1
shows a rendering of base rates of activation across the studies
in this database. What is striking is the degree to which some of
the regions that are themost common targets of informal reverse
inference (e.g., anterior cingulate and anterior insula) have the
highest base rates and therefore are the least able to support
strong reverse inferences.
Reverse Inference using Literature Mining
A thorough analysis of reverse inference using meta-analytic
data is difficult because it requires manual annotation of each
data set in order to specify which mental processes are engaged
by the task. Databases such as BrainMap rely upon relatively
coarse ontologies of mental function, whichmeans that although
one can assess the strength of inferences for broad concepts
such as ‘‘language,’’ it is not possible to perform these analyses
for finer-grained concepts that are likely to be of greater interest
to many researchers.
An alternative approach relies upon the assumption that the
words used in a paper should bear a systematic relation to the
concepts that are being examined. Yarkoni et al. (2011) used
the automatically extracted activation coordinates for 3,489
published articles, along with the full text of those articles, to
test this form of reverse inference: instead of asking how predic-
tive an activation map is for some particular mental process (as
manually annotated by an expert), this analysis asked how well
one can predict the presence of a particular term in the paper
given activation in a particular region. Although there are clearly
a number of reasons why this approach might fail, Yarkoni et al.
(2011) found that for many terms it was possible to accurately
predict activation in specific regions given the presence of the
term (i.e., forward inference), as well as to predict the likelihood
of the term in the paper given activation in a specific region (i.e.,
reverse inference). We also found that it was possible to classify
data from individual participants with reasonable accuracy, as
well as to classify the presence of words in individual studies
against as many as ten alternatives, which suggests that these
meta-analytic data can provide the basis for relatively large-
scale generalizable reverse inference.
A challenge to the use of literature mining to perform reverse
inference is that it is based on the language that researchers
use in their papers and may thus tend to reify informal reverse
inferences. For example, if researchers in the past tended to
interpret activation in the anterior cingulate cortex as reflecting
‘‘conflict’’ based on informal reverse inference, then this will
increase the support obtained from a literature-based meta-
analysis for this reverse inference (because that analysis exam-
ines the degree towhich the presence of activation in the anterior
cingulate is uniquely predictive of the term ‘‘conflict’’ appearing
in the text). Another challenge for this approach arises from the
coarse nature of coordinate-based meta-analytic data, which
will probably limit accurate generalization to domains in which
the relevant activation is distributed across large areas rather
than being reflected in finer-grained patterns of activation; for
example, it will be much easier to identify data sets in which
visual motion is present than to identify a particular motion direc-
tion. Finally, literature-based analysis is complicated by theNeuron 72, December 8, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 693
Figure 1. Base Rates for Activation
A rendering of base rates of activation across 3,489 studies in the literature;
increasingly hot colors (from yellow to red) reflect more frequent activation
across all studies, with the reddest regions active in more than 20% of all
studies. Regions of most frequent activation included the anterior cingulate
cortex, anterior insula, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Reprinted with
permission from Yarkoni et al. (2011).
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mental concepts they are studying; classification will be more
accurate for terms that are used more consistently and precisely
in the literature. Despite these limitations, the meta-analytic
approach has the potential to provide useful insights into the
potential strength of reverse inferences.
Decoding Mental States: Toward Formal
Reverse Inference
Whereas the kind of reverse inference described above is
informal, in the sense that it is based on the researcher’s knowl-
edge of associations between activation and mental functions,
a more recent approach provides the ability to formally test the
ability to infer mental states from neuroimaging data. Known
variously as multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA), multivariate
decoding, or pattern-information analysis, this approach uses
tools from the field of machine learning to create statistical
machines that can accurately decode the mental state that is
represented by a particular imaging data set. In the last 10 years,
this approach has become very popular in the fMRI literature; for
example, in the first 8months of 2011 there have beenmore than
50 publications using these methods, versus 41 for the entire
period before 2009.
A pioneering example of this approach was the study by
Haxby et al. (2001), which showed that it was possible to accu-
rately classify which one of several classes of objects a subject
was viewing by using a nearest-neighbor approach, in which
a test data set was compared to training data sets obtained for
each of the classes of interest. Whereas early work using
MVPA focused largely on the decoding of visual stimulus
features, such as object identity (Haxby et al., 2001) or simple
visual features (Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kamitani and Tong,
2005), it is now clear that more complex mental states can also
be decoded from fMRI data. For example, several studies have
shown that future intentions to perform particular tasks can be694 Neuron 72, December 8, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.decoded with reasonable accuracy (Gilbert, 2011; Haynes
et al., 2007). These studies show that it is possible to quantita-
tively estimate the degree to which a pattern of brain activation
is predictive of the engagement of a specific mental process
and to thus provide a formal means to implement reverse infer-
ence. They have also provided evidence that activation in
some regions may be less diagnostic than is required (and often
assumed) for effective reverse inference. For example, neither
the ‘‘fusiform face area’’ nor the ‘‘parahippocampal place
area’’ is particularly diagnostic for the stimulus classes that acti-
vate them most strongly (faces or scenes respectively) (Hanson
and Halchenko, 2008).
Model-Based Approaches
The approach to decoding described above treats the relation
between mental states and neuroimaging activation patterns
as a data mining problem, estimating relations between the
two using statistical brute force. An alternative and more princi-
pled approach has been developed more recently, in which the
decoding of brain activation patterns is guided by computational
models of the putative processes that underlie the psychological
function. In one landmark study, Mitchell et al. (2008) showed
that it was possible to use the activation patterns from one set
of concrete nouns to predict the patterns of activation in another
set of untrained words. These predictions were derived using
a model that identified semantic features based on correlations
between noun and verb usage in a very large corpus of text.
By using ‘‘semantic feature maps’’ that reflect the activation
associated with a semantic feature (which is derived from the
mapping of nouns to verbs in the training corpus) predicted acti-
vation maps were then obtained by projecting the untrained
words into the semantic feature space. These predicted maps
were highly accurate, allowing above-chance classification of
pairs of untrained words in all of the nine participants.
Another study published by Kay et al. (2008) examined the
ability to classify natural images based on fMRI data from the
visual cortices. This study estimated a receptive field model for
each voxel (based on Gabor wavelets), which modeled the
voxel’s response along spatial location, spatial frequency, and
orientation dimensions, using fMRI data collected while viewing
a set of 1,750 natural images. They then applied the model to
a set of 120 images that were not included in the training set
and attempted to identify which image was being viewed based
on the predicted brain activity derived from the receptive field
model. The model was highly accurate at decoding which image
was being viewed, even when the set of possible images was as
large as 1,000. These studies highlight the utility of using inter-
mediate models of the stimulus space to constrain decoding
attempts.
In the former cases, the decoding problem was relatively con-
strained by the presence of a set of test items to be compared,
which varied from 2 in the Mitchell et al. (2008) study to up to
1,000 in the Kay et al. (2008). However, subsequent work has
shown that it is possible to provide realistic reconstruction of
entire images from fMRI data using Bayesian inference with
natural image priors, in effect reading the image from the
subject’s mind. Naselaris et al. (2009) used a model similar to
the one described for the Kay et al. (2008) study to attempt to
reconstruct images from brain activation. They found that the
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than chance with regard to their accuracy. However, by using
a database of six million randomly selected natural images as
priors, it was possible to create image reconstructions that had
structural accuracy substantially better than chance. Further-
more, using a hybrid model that also included semantic labels
for the images, the reconstructions also had a high degree of
semantic accuracy. Another study by Pereira et al. (2011) used
a similar approach to generate concrete words frombrain activa-
tion, using a ‘‘topic model’’ trained on corpus of text from
Wikipedia. These studies highlight the utility of model-based
decoding, which provides much more powerful decoding abili-
ties via the use of computational models that better characterize
mental processes along with statistical information mined from
large online databases.
Toward Large-Scale Decoding of Mental States
The foregoing examples of successful decoding are impressive,
but each is focused on decoding between different stimuli
(images or concrete words) for which the relevant representa-
tions are located within a circumscribed set of brain areas at
a relatively small spatial scale (e.g., cortical columns). In these
cases, decoding likely relies upon the relative activity of specific
subpopulations of neurons within those relevant cortical regions
or the fine-grained vascular architecture in those regions (see
Kriegeskorte et al., 2010 for further discussion of this issue). In
many cases, however, the goal of reverse inference is to identify
what mental processes are engaged against a much larger set of
possibilities. We refer to this here as ‘‘large-scale’’ decoding, in
which ‘‘scale’’ refers to both the spatial scale of the relevant
neural systems and the breadth of the possible mental states
being decoded. Such large-scale decoding is challenging
because it requires training data acquired across a much larger
set of possible mental states. At the same time, it is more likely to
rely upon distributions of activation across many regions across
the brain and thus has a greater likelihood of generalizing across
individuals compared to the decoding of specific stimuli, which is
more likely to rely upon idiosyncratic features of individual
brains. Althoughmost previous decoding studies have examined
generalization within the same individuals, a number of previous
studies has shown that it is possible to generalize across individ-
uals (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Moura˜o-Miranda et al., 2005; Shin-
kareva et al., 2008).
In an attempt to test the large-scale decoding concept, we
(Poldrack et al., 2009) examined the ability to classify which of
eight different mental tasks an individual was engaged in, using
statistical summaries of activation for each task compared to
rest from each subject. The classifier was tested on individuals
who were not included in the training set; the results showed
that highly accurate classification was possible, even when
generalizing across individuals. Accurate classification was
possible using small regions of interest but was greatest using
whole-brain data, suggesting that decoding of tasks relied
upon both local and global information. Although this work
provides a proof of concept for large-scale decoding, true
large-scale decoding is still far away; the eight mental tasks
tested in this study are but a drop in the very large bucket
of possible psychological functions, and each function wouldprobably need to be tested using multiple tasks to ensure inde-
pendence from specific task features.
Amajor challenge for large-scale decoding is the lack of a suffi-
cient database of raw fMRI data on which to train classifiers
across a large number of different tasks and stimuli. The devel-
opment of large databases of task-based fMRI data, such as
the OpenFMRI project (http://www.openfmri.org), should help
provide the data needed for such large-scale decoding analyses.
In addition to the need for larger databases, there is also an
urgent need for more detailed metadata describing the tasks
and processes associated with each data set. The Cognitive
Atlas project (http://www.cognitiveatlas.org; Poldrack et al.,
2011) is currently developing an ontology that will serve as
a framework for detailed annotation of neuroimaging databases,
but this is a major undertaking that will require substantial work
by the community before it is completed. Until these resources
arewell developed, the ability to classifymental states on a larger
scale is largely theoretical.
Limits on Decoding
Despite the incredible power of thesemethods to decodemental
states from neuroimaging data, some important limits remain.
Foremost, decoding methods cannot overcome the fact that
neuroimaging data are inherently correlational (cf. Poldrack,
2000), and thus demonstration of significant decoding does
not prove that a region is necessary for themental function being
decoded. Lesion studies and manipulations of brain function
using methods such as transcranial magnetic stimulation will
remain essential for identifying which regions are necessary
and which are epiphenomenal. Conversely, a region could be
important for a function even if it is not diagnostic of that function
in a decoding analysis. For example, it is known that the left
anterior insula is critical for speech articulation (Dronkers,
1996). However, given the high base rate of activation in this
region (see Figure 1), it is unlikely that large-scale decoding
analyses would find this region to be diagnostic of articulation
as opposed to the many other mental functions that seem to
activate it.
Another important feature of most decoding methods is that
they are highly opportunistic, i.e., they will take advantage of
any information present that is correlated with the processes of
interest. For example, in a recent comparison of univariate and
multivariate analysis methods in a decision-making task (Jimura
and Poldrack, 2011), we found that many regions showed
decoding sensitivity using multivariate methods that did not
show differences in activation using univariate methods. This
included regions such as the motor cortex, which presumably
carries information about the motor response that the subject
made (in this case, pressing one of four different buttons). If
one simply wishes to accurately decode behavior, then this is
interesting and useful, but from the standpoint of understanding
the neural architecture of decision making, it is likely a red
herring. More generally, it is important to distinguish between
predictive power and neurobiological reality. One common
strategy is to enter a large number of voxels into a decoding anal-
ysis and then examine the importance of each voxel for decoding
(e.g., by using the weights obtained from a regularized linear
model, as in Cohen et al., 2010). This can provide some usefulNeuron 72, December 8, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 695
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does not necessarily imply that the pattern of weights is reflective
of the neural coding of information. Rather, it more likely reflects
thematch between the coding of information as reflected in fMRI
(which includes a contribution from the specific vascular archi-
tecture of the region) and the specific characteristics of the
statistical machine being used. For example, analyses obtained
using methods that employ sparseness penalties (e.g., Carroll
et al., 2009) will result in a smaller number of features that
support decoding compared to a method using other forms of
penalties, but such differences would be reflective of the statis-
tical tool rather than the brain.
Finally, the ability to accurately decode mental states or func-
tions is fundamentally limited by the accuracy of the ontology
that describes those mental entities. In many cases of fine-
grained decoding (e.g., ‘‘Is the subject viewing a cat or
a horse?’’), the organization of those mental states is relatively
well defined. However, for decoding of higher-level mental
functions (e.g., ‘‘Is the subject engaging working memory?’’),
there is often much less agreement over the nature or even
the existence of those functions. We (Lenartowicz et al.,
2010) have proposed that one might actually use classification
to test claims about the underlying mental ontology; that is, if
a set of mental concepts cannot be distinguished from one
another based on neuroimaging data that are meant to manip-
ulate each one separately, then that suggests that the concepts
may not actually be distinct. This might simply reflect termino-
logical differences (e.g., the interchangeable use of ‘‘executive
control’’ and ‘‘cognitive control’’) but could also reflect more
fundamental problems with theoretical distinctions that are
made in the literature.
Whither Reverse Inference?
Given the youth of cognitive neuroscience and the enormity of
the problem that we aim to solve, we should use every possible
strategy at our disposal, so long as it is valid. Viewed as a means
to generate novel hypotheses, I think that reverse inference can
be a very useful strategy, especially if it is based on real data
(such as the meta-analytic maps from Yarkoni et al., 2011) rather
than on an informal reading of the literature. In fact, reverse infer-
ence in this sense is an example of ‘‘abductive inference’’
(Pierce, 1998) or ‘‘reasoning to the best explanation,’’ which is
widely appreciated as a useful means of scientific reasoning.
The problem with this kind of reasoning arises when such
hypotheses become reified as facts, as was well stated by the
psychologist Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, 2009):
The more difficult test, for a general psychologist, is to
remember that the new idea is still a hypothesis which
has passed only a rather low standard of proof. I know
the test is difficult, because I fail it: I believe the interpreta-
tion, and do not label it with an asterisk when I think about
it. (p. 524)
I would argue that this test is often difficult not just for general
psychologists, but also for neuroimaging researchers, who far
too often drop the asterisk that should adorn a hypothesis
derived from reverse inference until it has been directly tested
in further studies.696 Neuron 72, December 8, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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